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EXAMINING JUSTICE BREYER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENTIAL
THINKING: CAN JUSTICE SCALIA BE
WRONG AND JUSTICE KENNEDY BE
RIGHT?
DANIEL GORDON*
INTRODUCTION
United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer finds a
democratic theme in the United States Constitution to which
judges should pay more attention.1 This democratic theme in the
Constitution emerges from the Constitution's inclusion of active
liberty.2 Justice Breyer distinguishes between two liberties: an-
cient and modern. 3 Modern liberty is civil liberty that guarantees
freedom from government to individuals,4 while ancient liberty
consists of sharing a nation's sovereign authority with that na-
tion's citizens.5 Active liberty, according to the ancients, impli-
cates "the people's right to 'an active and constant participation
in a nation's collective power."'6 Justice Breyer believes that the
United States Constitution protects Americans' rights to partici-
" Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; B.A. Haverford College; J.D.,
Boston College.
I See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 7 (2005) (arguing that the theme that Judges follow in their decisions can
impact their constitutional interpretations tremendously).
2 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 5 (suggesting that active liberty is essential to democ-
racy).
3 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 4-5 (stating Benjamin Constant's view that both ancient
and modern liberties need to be taken together and balanced in order to create one prop-
erly functioning democratic society).
4 BREYER, supra note 1, at 5.
5 BREYER, supra note 1, at 4.
6 BREYER, supra note 1, at 5.
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pate in government.7 He proposes that judges focus on this right
to participate when they interpret the Constitution.8 This democ-
ratic theme implicates a constitutional and statutory interpretive
tradition that views legal texts, including the Constitution, as
"driven by purposes."9 Justice Breyer also views the active liberty
constitutional interpretive tradition as focusing on the conse-
quences of textual interpretation upon the community that will
be affected by constitutional interpretation. 10
This article focuses on Justice Breyer's emphasis upon conse-
quential thinking in his constitutional analysis."a First, this arti-
cle will review how Justice Breyer applied his consequential ana-
lytical model to the Establishment Clause, 12  which he
emphasizes as implicating strong consequential concerns. 13 Next,
this article analyzes Justice Scalia's consequential style in the
context of gay rights, 14 and Justice Kennedy's consequential style
in the context of the death penalty. 15 Last, the article compares
and contrasts all three styles, suggesting that Justice Breyer ei-
ther rethink his own style or deemphasize the importance of con-
sequential thinking for constitutional interpretation. 16
I. PURPOSES AND THE NATURE OF BREYER'S CONSEQUENTIAL
THINKING
Justice Breyer believes that most judges approach and decide
cases, including constitutional cases, with similar methods and
skills because judges are professionals. Judicial training and le-
7 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 10 (finding that the New Deal and Warren Court ex-
panded the scope of citizens' rights to participate in government by focusing on ways in
which the Constitution protected active liberty).
8 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 11 (concluding that the current Court is guilty of neglect-
ing the importance of active liberty in contemporary society).
9 BREYER, supra note 1, at 17 (arguing that the active liberty approach encourages judi-
cial restraint by forcing judges to 'say what was the underlying purpose expressed' in a
statute").
10 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 18 (stating that these consequences on the community
include social, political, and industrial conditions).
11 See infra Part I.
12 See infra Part II.
13 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 120-24 (analyzing the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment under the consequential analytical model and concluding that the
clause preempted government aid to parents of students in parochial schools).
14 See infra Part III.A.
15 See infra Part III.B.
16 See infra Parts IV, V.
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gal experience leave judges with analytical methods and skills in
examining textual "language, history, tradition, precedent, pur-
pose, and consequences."17 Though judges may share a similar
armory of analytical weaponry, individual judges differ in the
emphasis that they give to each of the skills and methods. Some
judges emphasize textual language, history, and tradition, while
other judges emphasize "purpose and consequence[s]."18 Justice
Breyer emphasizes the use of purposes and consequences in in-
terpreting legal texts, including the Constitution.19 Justice
Breyer prioritizes the use of understanding the purposes of legal
texts and understanding the analyses of the consequences of in-
terpreting legal texts in one way or another because he believes
that law is tied to life, and textual interpretation is tied to hu-
man activity that the law seeks to benefit. 20 Justice Breyer com-
mends the Warren Court for emphasizing the purposes of the
Constitution and the consequences of constitutional interpreta-
tion 21 and notes that the current Court on which he serves has
swung too far away from an emphasis on purpose and conse-
quences in constitutional analysis. 22
For Justice Breyer, legal texts are driven by purposes. 23 As a
whole, the Constitution as a whole furthers basic general pur-
poses.24 Judges should discern the underlying purposes expressed
in legal texts, reading constitutional language as revealing great
17 BREYER, supra note 1, at 110.
is BREYER, supra note 1, at 8.
19 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 115 (noting that focusing on the Constitution's purpose
promotes liberty by insisting on statutory and constitutional interpretations that are con-
sistent with the people's will, whereas focusing on the Constitution's consequences meas-
ures the court's level of success in promoting that will).
20 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 100 (emphasizing the value of purpose-driven interpre-
tations of laws and legal texts in relation to the benefit(s) sought to be provided to people
and society by those laws and legal texts).
21 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 10-11 (stating that "[tihe [Warren Court] interpreted
the Civil War amendments in light of their basic purposes, thereby directly helping Afri-
can Americans become full members of the nation's community of self-governing citi-
zens").
22 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 11 ( "I will suggest that [the Court] may have swung
back too far, too often underemphasizing or overlooking the contemporary importance of
active liberty.").
23 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that interpretive "tradition sees texts as
driven by purposes").
24 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 115.
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purposes "-'ended to be achieved by the Constitution. 25 Individ-
ual constitutional provisions embody highly generalized basic
purposes that help judges to understand and apply those specific
constitutional provisions.26 Justice Breyer views the overarching
aim of the Constitution as furthering active liberty by creating a
form of government in which all citizens share governmental au-
thority and participate in public policy creation. 27 Justice Breyer
also views some clauses of the Constitution as possessing more
narrow purposes than those of the overall document. For in-
stance, the Equal Protection Clause demands that American law
equally respect each individual. 28 Overall, Justice Breyer urges
judges to refer to the Constitution's basic democratic purposes, or
objectives, to shape constitutional doctrine, reconcile competing
constitutional values, and interpret and apply legal text gener-
ally.29
Justice Breyer related legal textual purposes closely with the
consequences of interpreting and applying legal texts, including
the Constitution. 30 Because legal texts are connected to the lives
of individuals and communities regulated and protected by those
texts, judges should consider the consequences of legal textual in-
terpretations, including the impact of textual interpretation on
the social, economic, and political conditions of communities. 31
Since law helps communities of individuals democratically to find
practical solutions to contemporary problems, judges should con-
25 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 17-18 ("The judge should read constitutional language
'as the revelation of the great purposes which were intended to be achieved by the Consti-
tution' itself, a 'framework for' and a 'continuing instrument of government."').
26 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 115 (arguing that the "understanding of, and a focus
upon, those general purposes will help a judge better to understand and to apply specific
provisions").
27 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 33 (describing James Madison's view of the Constitution
"as creating a form of government in which all citizens share the government's authority,
participating in the creation of public policy").
28 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 77 (noting that "[the view] consequently demands laws
that equally respect each individual").
29 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 109 ("I have tried to show how, in varying contexts, ref-
erence to the Constitution's basic democratic objectives can help courts shape constitu-
tional doctrine, reconcile competing constitutional values, time judicial intervention, in-
terpret statutory ambiguities, and create room for agency interpretations.").
30 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 115 (noting that "[t]hroughout, I have urged attention
to purpose and consequences").
31 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 18 (explaining that a Judge must not only consider his
sole views when interpreting such open-ended provisions as the due process and equal
protection clauses).
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sider practical consequences of constitutional interpretation. 32
Since constitutional purposes operate in the real world of peo-
ple,33 judges should not shy away from legal conclusions based on
real world consequences, even when judicial critics would prefer
judges to avoid consideration of such consequences. 34 For in-
stance, Justice Breyer would have judges consider the practical
effects on local democratic self-government of constitutional deci-
sions interpreting and applying principles of federalism.35 Also,
he would have judges analyze the practical effects of technology
and privacy law on each other. 36
Justice Breyer strongly believes that consequential thinking
should be an emphasized component of constitutional analysis
and warns that a different interpretive approach that deempha-
sizes consequential thinking exacts a high constitutional price.37
Justice Breyer worries that textualist and originalist constitu-
tional doctrines that avoid consequential analyses may produce
harmful consequences. 3  For instance, a literalist interpretive
approach to the Equal Protection Clause could create social divi-
siveness, impeding the democratic unity required to make consti-
tutionally-created institutions work as intended.39 For Justice
Breyer, the consequences of interpreting and applying the Equal
Protection Clause should be the diminution of the risk of serious
racial division in the United States. 40 Justice Breyer warns
32 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 6 (describing practical consequences as "consequences
valued in terms of constitutional purposes, when the interpretation of constitutional lan-
guage is at issue").
33 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 16 ("And in the real world, institutions and methods of
interpretation must be designed in a way such that this form of liberty is both sustainable
over time and capable of translating the people's will into sound policies.").
34 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 116 (revealing judicial critics' fear that judges will blend
their personal beliefs when decision-making and disregard the history and legal precedent
set forth in the Constitution).
35 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 63 (suggesting a need for a more proficient exchange of
communication "between Congress and the Court in this area").
36 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 68-69 (conveying the need to balance various societal in-
terests when analyzing the effect of technology on previously existing privacy laws).
37 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 12 ( "[I]ncreased attention upon the Constitution's de-
mocratic objective . . .promote[s] re-emphasis of those objectives as an important theme
that significantly helps judges interpret the Constitution.").
38 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 129 (noting that such harmful consequences may out-
weigh "whatever risks of subjectivity or uncertainty are inherent in other approaches").
39 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 131 ("Literalism has a tendency to undermine the Con-
stitution's efforts to create a framework for democratic government .... ").
40 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 83-84 (describing such racial division as "a division that
exclusion from elite educational institutions would aggravate").
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against overemphasizing eighteenth-century originalist concepts
that undermine a twenty-first century Supreme Court applying
constitutional values. 41 He even applauds consequential thinking
that radically changes constitutional doctrine, 42 pointing to
Plessy v. Ferguson43 as a doctrine that needed to change on the
basis of consequential analysis. 44 Justice Breyer noted that
Brown v. Board of Education45 and subsequent racial segregation
cases "overruled Plessy, and the law changed in a way that pro-
foundly affected the lives of many."46
Justice Breyer's emphasis on consequential thinking evidenced
a broader constitutional policy concern about the relevance of
constitutional principles to contemporary, always shifting social
life in America. For Justice Breyer, Plessy and Brown serve as
two examples of the reasons why measuring consequences is
critical to constitutional decision making. In his view, judges
must recognize that the Constitution applies to ever-changing
subject matters never considered by the framers of the Constitu-
tion.47 Consequential thinking exposed the fatal flaw of Plessy by
demonstrating that racial segregation meant inequality and dis-
respect for African-Americans. 48 Consequential analysis allows
Judges to apply the Constitution by reconstructing past solu-
tions, especially failed ones based on concrete occasions of life
that form the contexts for constitutional decision making.49 Jus-
41 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 73 (noting that the Court's recent holding that police
cannot use thermal imaging devices to monitor household activities "warns against adopt-
ing an overly rigid method of interpreting the Constitution-placing weight upon eight-
eenth-century details to the point at which it becomes difficult for a twenty-first-century
court to apply the document's underlying values").
42 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 119 ('To be sure, a court focused on consequences may
decide a case in a way that radically changes the law. But this is not always a bad
thing.").
43 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 119 (stating that Plessy led to a "society that was totally
unequal, a consequence directly contrary to the purpose and demands of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
45 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46 BREYER, supra note 1, at 119.
47 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 18 ('The judge should recognize that the Constitution
will apply to 'new subject matter ... with which the framers were not familiar."').
48 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 119 ("[Ilt became apparent that segregation did not
mean equality but meant disrespect for members of a minority race").
49 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 18 ("[T]he judge, whether applying statute or Constitu-
tion, should 'reconstruct the past solution imaginatively in its setting and project the pur-
poses which inspired it upon the concrete occasions which arise for their decision."').
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tice Breyer utilizes Establishment Clause analysis to demon-
strate his devotion and approach to consequential thinking.
II. BREYER: CONSEQUENTIAL THINKING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Establishment Clause provides a clear context for Justice
Breyer's consequential constitutional analysis. Justice Breyer's
view of Establishment Clause public policy also highlights his
analytical interlinking of constitutional purposes with constitu-
tional consequences. Justice Breyer urges judges to examine the
consequences of constitutional interpretation through the lenses
of the constitution's values or purposes. 50 For Justice Breyer, a
primary, emphatic purpose of the Establishment Clause is the
avoidance of religious strife in American society and political sys-
tems by drawing relatively clear lines between church and state,
especially where religious core beliefs and practices are at is-
sue.51 The Establishment Clause protects the "Nation's social
fabric from religious conflict."5 2 Social divisiveness based on relig-
ion would sap the strength of American government and religion,
threatening the peaceful dominion that religion exercises in
America.5 3 The changing immigrant social nature of American
society in the twentieth century heightened the need for the
separation of church and state,54 because now the United States
serves as home to dozens of religious groups and subgroups from
around the world.55
Breyer warns that the relation between government and relig-
ion is one of separation, not social conflict, creating mutual hos-
tility and suspicion. To assure that the Establishment Clause
5o See BREYER, supra note 1, at 120 ('The judge must examine the consequences
through the lens of the relevant constitutional value or purpose.").
51 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 722-23 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(concluding that the Establishment Clause can be interpreted to avoid religious conflict by
creating clear separation between church and state when primary religious education is
at issue).
52 Id. at 717.
53 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting the nega-
tive effect of religious divisiveness and importance of First Amendment religion clauses
on peace among religions existing in the United States).
5 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 121 (suggesting that the nature of twentieth-century so-
ciety makes it necessary to interpret the First Amendment broadly).
55 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 723 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (highlighting the fact that Amer-
ica has more than fifty-five different religious groups and subgroups).
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maintains the delicate balance between neutrality toward relig-
ion, not hostility toward religion, Establishment Clause cases
remain exercises in legal judgment based not only on the social
conflict avoidance purpose of the Establishment and Free Exer-
cise Clauses, but also on consequences measured in light of that
social conflict avoidance purpose. 56
Justice Breyer develops and utilizes in his Establishment
Clause analysis three styles of consequential thinking. First, he
utilizes a macroscopic style of consequential analysis in which he
provides a vague broad-brush historical overview of the social
consequences of the failure to include an Establishment Clause
or its equivalent within foreign legal systems. Justice Breyer
strongly implies that religious war and strife were the conse-
quences of having no Establishment Clause and no wall of sepa-
ration in eighteenth-century and pre-eighteenth-century Europe;
he notes the seventeenth century to have included decades of re-
ligious war. 57 In addition to war, a lack of separation of state and
religion engendered religious intolerance. Specifically, the his-
tory of governmentally-established religion in England evidenced
the inevitability of hatred, disrespect and contempt for those who
held religious beliefs contrary to the governmentally-preferred
form of religion.58 Justice Breyer vaguely implies that even in
twenty-first-century Britain and France, the lack of an Ameri-
can-style constitutional Establishment Clause creates a legal
void where a newly-emerging religious heterogeneity results in
religious strife.59 Overall, the macroscopic consequential analysis
is sweeping, vague, implicit at most, and generally historical, in-
volving foreign cultures.
Justice Breyer's second type of consequential thinking is a mid-
range thinking between a macroscopic, broad view of general
consequences and a microscopic, focused view of specific conse-
quences. The mid-range consequential thinking is more specific
66 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring) (concluding that Establish-
ment Clause judgments must account for consequences measured in light of the clause's
underlying purpose).
.57 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the First Amend-
ment religion clauses represent the understanding that liberty and social stability de-
mand a religious tolerance respecting those different views).
58 See id. at 718-19 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)) (describing the
effect of governmentally-established religion in England).
69 See id. at 725 (noting that "recent waves of immigration have begun to create prob-
lems of social divisiveness").
[Vol. 23:1
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and focused than the macroscopic thinking. For one, Justice
Breyer's mid-range thinking focuses geographically on the conse-
quences of a weak application of the Establishment Clause in the
United States when the wall of separation between state and re-
ligion was a low one. Justice Breyer recognizes the existence of
governmentally-established religion in the United States. 60 As in
England, American-established religion resulted in hatred, disre-
spect, and contempt. 61
Early-American separation of church and state was less clear-
cut,62 but that weak separation of church and state failed to rec-
ognize the growth of a large American Catholic minority in the
mid-to-late nineteenth century. 63 Catholics faced discrimination
from a Protestant-controlled government structure, and they
fought back for religious equality.64 As a result, Establishment
Clause law adapted to new social circumstances, and twentieth-
century Establishment Clause doctrine now allows for govern-
mental support of secular, non-sectarian aspects of religious edu-
cation such as transportation, computers, and texts, and the con-
sequences are little or no religious turmoil and strife. 65 Overall,
Justice Breyer's mid-range consequential thinking is less expan-
sive and generalized than his macroscopic consequential think-
ing. Justice Breyer focuses only on the Establishment Clause
and its impact on American society. He describes more specific
religious strife and conflict between identified religious groups,
but he also remains expansive and sweeping in his historical
overview capturing eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth-
century American social group relations in a few sentences and
paragraphs.
Justice Breyer's third consequential thinking style focuses on
the specific, focused results of identifiable and identified govern-
60 See id. at 718 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
61 See id. at 718-19 (quoting Engel v, Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)) (outlining gov-
ernmentally-established religion, both in England and America).
62 See id. at 719-20 ( "[A]n earlier American society might have found a less clear-cut
church/state separation compatible with social tranquility.").
63 See id. at 720 ("By 1850, 1.6 million Catholics lived in America, and by 1900 that
number rose to 12 million." (citing John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political His-
tory of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 299-300 (2001))).
6 See id. at 720-21 (discussing Protestant discrimination and how Catholics fought
back by pursuing "equal government support for the education of their children").
65 See id. at 726 ("[The Establishment Clause currently permits States to channel vari-
ous forms of assistance to religious schools, for example, transportation costs for students,
computers, and secular texts.").
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ment programs that seek to further religion. If those programs
are allowed to exist in the context of the Establishment Clause
wall of separation between church and state, very specific and
identifiable negative consequences will occur. The Ten Com-
mandments posted on government property and school vouchers
paid by public monies for children attending religious schools re-
sult in very specific negative consequences. The display of the
Ten Commandments in a state courthouse convinced Justice
Breyer that "the display sought to serve its sponsors' primarily
religious objectives and that many of its viewers would under-
stand it as reflecting that motivation."66 Justice Breyer points to
the history of the courthouse display as a stormy history that is
likely to continue to prove divisive. 67 Justice Breyer also points to
the school vouchers and Establishment Clause acceptance and
legitimization of those school vouchers as risking the creation of
"a form of religiously based conflict potentially harmful to the na-
tion's social fabric." 68 For school vouchers, Justice Breyer creates
a long list of very specific divisive issues and problems. Vouchers
will create divisiveness because different religious groups will
fight to influence the legal criteria that public policy makers will
use to distribute billions of dollars of public monies to religious
schools. Different religions will clash while reviewing the im-
plementation of public programs that provide the monies. 69 Relig-
ions will clash over religious doctrines that cast members of relig-
ions in negative terms. The American public will react
negatively to religious school coverage of current events such as
the conflict in the Middle East.70 Taxpayers who do not want to
fund religious education will be antagonized and small religious
66 BREYER, supra note 1, at 122-23.
67 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[Tihe short (and stormy)
history of the courthouse Commandments' displays demonstrates the substantially reli-
gious objectives of those who mounted them .... And, in today's world, in a Nation of so
many different religious .. .beliefs, a more contemporary state effort to focus attention
upon a religious text is certainly likely to prove divisive .... ").
68 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 728-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[G]overnment funding of
this kind of religious endeavor is far more contentious than providing funding for secular
textbooks, computers, vocational training, or even funding for adults who wish to obtain a
college education at a religious university.").
69 See id. at 723 (questioning how the "equal opportunity"' principle will work "without
risking the 'struggle of sect against sect"').
70 See id. at 724-725 ("[A]ny major funding program for primary religious education
will require criteria. And the selection of those criteria, as well as their application, inevi-
tably pose problems that are divisive.").
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minorities unable to establish their own religious schools will be
marginalized along with those who hold religious beliefs that for-
bid them from taking public monies to support religious educa-
tion.71 Even more generally, a conflict will arise between those
parents who support public schools and those parents who sup-
port religious schools because taxpayer dollars will be shifted
from public schools to private schools. Justice Breyer notes that
generally, history evidences government involvement in religious
primary education as far more divisive than more neutral gov-
ernmental preferences for religious institutions such as tax ex-
emptions. 72
Overall, in his microscopic consequential analysis, Justice
Breyer develops very specific causes of social division and very
specific clashes between different American groups. However, as
Justice Breyer becomes more specific with his concerns about so-
cial divisiveness, he becomes more speculative and futuristic.
His lists of social chaos center around what could or will happen
in the future-not what has already occurred. Even his use of
history is vague, generalized, and conclusive. History conclu-
sively and generally shows that government involvement with re-
ligious education is more divisive than other types of government
support for religion. Justice Breyer is so speculative and futuris-
tic in developing his lists of social horribles that he uses Socratic
methodology in framing his specific concerns. For instance, he
asks, "[w]hy will different religions not become concerned about,
and seek to influence, the criteria used to channel this money to
religious schools?"73 He asks more than one such focused ques-
tion. 74 The closest he comes to very specific microscopic conse-
quences is the history of a lack of litigation evidencing a lack of
religious and social divisiveness. Justice Breyer found a lack of
social divisiveness where a Ten Commandments monument stood
outside a state capitol building for forty years without anyone
71 See id. at 728 (arguing that parental choice does not help taxpayers who do not want
to finance religious education, religious minorities that are unable to create their own pri-
vate schools, and fringe religious groups that are ineligible for funding).
72 See id. at 727 (noting that property tax exemptions for religious institutions are less
divisive than government involvement in religious primary education).
73 Id. at 723.
74 See id. at 723-24 ("Why will they not want to examine the implementation of the
programs that provide this money -- to determine, for example, whether implementation
has biased a program toward or against particular sects, or whether recipient religious
schools are adequately fulfilling a program's criteria?").
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challenging the existence of the document.75 Even then, Justice
Breyer becomes futuristic and speculative when he notes that
forcing the removal of such a monument would itself create social
and religious contentiousness. 76
Justice Breyer uses three styles of consequential thinking. His
macroscopic style focuses on a broad view of social impact in a
sweep of history, specifically for Establishment Clause analysis
of European history. His observations of consequences are gen-
eralized and often implicit. Justice Breyer's mid-range conse-
quential analysis is more focused and specific concentrating in
the context of Establishment Clause analysis in American social
history, but his observations remain relatively generalized.
Again, he focuses on a broad sweep of eighteenth, nineteenth,
and twentieth-century American history viewing social conflict
between very large social groups, Protestant versus Catholic.
When Justice Breyer utilizes a microscopic consequential analy-
sis, he finds very specific social clashes over particular issues
such as the use of public monies to support religious schools.
However, even his microscopic analysis remains vague as it fo-
cuses on speculative social crises possible in the future. Justice
Breyer's consequential thinking differs from that of other Su-
preme Court Justices.
III. SCALIA AND KENNEDY: CONSEQUENTIAL THINKING IN THE
CONTEXT OF GAY RIGHTS AND TEENAGE MURDERERS,
RESPECTIVELY
Both Justices Scalia and Kennedy utilize consequential think-
ing in their constitutional analyses. However, each Justice util-
izes a distinct style and form of consequential thinking.
75 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that the presence of
the religious monument for more than forty years shows that few people understood their
presence as "a government effort to favor a particular religious sect").
76 See id. at 704 (noting that the removal of the tablets might induce hostility towards
religion in the law and encourage disputes concerning the removal of other "longstanding
depictions of the Ten Commandments from public buildings across the Nation").
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A. Justice Scalia and the Gay Destruction of American Democracy
and Tradition
Justice Scalia decries the consequences of recognizing the con-
stitutional equal protection of gays to be free from discrimination
based on sexual orientation 77 and the constitutional due process
right of gays to engage in acts of sexual intimacy. 78 Justice Scalia
pinpoints three negative consequences of constitutional protec-
tion of gay rights and sexual behavior. In fact, he sees far-
reaching implications beyond any single case. 79
First, he identifies a massive disruption of the current Ameri-
can social order.80
The constitutional protection of gay sexuality threatens the
end of all morals legislation, because the promotion of majori-
tarian sexual morality is no longer recognized as a legitimate
state interest.8 1 As a result, the American legal system will no
longer be authorized through majority vote in the state and fed-
eral legislatures to prohibit bigamy, same sex marriage, adult in-
cest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality,
and obscenity.8 2 The majority's belief that the immorality of gay
sexuality is no longer a rational basis for statutory law means
that a variety of judicial decisions and enactments remain en-
dangered, including the prohibition of the sale of sex toys, the
lack of a right to commit adultery and regulation of public inde-
cency.83 Justice Scalia implicitly lists an array of American insti-
77 See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(commenting on the interplay between the Constitution and homosexuality and that since
the Constitution says nothing about homosexuality, the Supreme Court has no business
forcing citizens to hold the view that hatred towards homosexuality is evil).
78 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586-605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that sodomy is not a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause).
79 See id. at 586 (suggesting that "rational-basis review" will have far-reaching implica-
tions).
80 See id. at 591 (arguing that the overruling of Bowers entails a "massive disruption of
the current social order").
81 See id. at 599 (noting that the majority opinion embraced the view that majoritarian
state views are no longer seen as sufficient reasons to uphold laws).
82 See id. (explaining that if promoting "majoritarian sexual morality is not ... a legiti-
mate' interest for states to regulate through regulation, none of the laws prohibiting sex-
ual acts can withstand review).
83 See id. at 589-90 (2003) (discussing how the prohibition on the sale of sex toys, adul-
tery, and public indecency was based on protecting public morality, and how the majority
decision calls into question the legitimacy of all of these prohibitions without making an
effort to exclude them from their holding).
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tutions threatened by the constitutional protection of gay sexual-
ity and the consequent disregard for majoritarian morality that
condemns gay sexuality as criminal. These institutions include
the United States Armed Forces, local fire departments, police
departments, prisons, and grandchildren.8 4
The second type of consequence identified by Justice Scalia re-
sulting from the constitutional protection of gays implicates the
American political order. Constitutional protections for gays, ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, frustrates majoritarian efforts to pre-
serve traditional American moral values8 5 and places the Ameri-
can courts in the position of taking sides in the culture wars
between heterosexuals and gays. This system implicitly awards
gays advantages in those culture wars.8 6 Justice Scalia implies
that gays gain favored legal status when the Constitution pro-
tects gay rights and behavior,8 7 making it difficult for the Ameri-
can mainstream that harbors anti-gay attitudes to discriminate
legally against gay people.88 Justice Scalia notes, "Many Ameri-
cans do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual con-
duct .... They view this as protecting themselves and their fami-
lies from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and
destructive."8 9 Gays possess political power much greater than
their minority status numbers and they devote their vast politi-
cal power to achieving full social acceptance instead of living with
grudging social toleration. 90 Gays enhance their power with aid of
84 See id. at 590 n.2 (explaining that society has relied upon the idea that homosexual
sodomy is not a fundamental right).
85 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 651 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that failing to
perceive the social harm of homosexuality stunts state efforts to uphold "traditional
American moral values").
86 See id. at 652 (arguing that the majority's holding invented "a novel and extravagant
constitutional doctrine" in order to "take the victory away from traditional forces" in the
war between heterosexual and homosexual culture).
87 See id. at 644 (discussing that homosexuals can gain the same favored status as other
citizens such as racial minorities and senior citizens and that by finding the Colorado
statute, barring the favoring of homosexuals merely because they are homosexuals, to be
constitutional, homosexuals are gaining an additional favored status simply because they
engage in homosexual acts).
88 See Lawrence, 539 U.S.at 602-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that what the
Court calls 'discrimination"' is often legal practice in many states, and in some circum-
stances this alleged discrimination is even "a constitutional right").
89 Id. at 602.
90 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that homosexuals tend
to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities, thus giving them greater
power to push acceptance of homosexuality than would commonly be expected of minority
groups).
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the American legal profession that "has largely signed on to the
so-called homosexual agenda." 91 The American lawyer class and
its law schools seek to recast majoritarian moral opposition to
homosexuality into homophobic prejudice; in doing so, the elite
lawyer class seeks to stamp out plebeian, mainstream social atti-
tudes.92 Accordingly, constitutional rights for gays results in the
imposition of legal and moral standards by a governing elite that
undermines the majority law by making prerogatives of the
American majority.93
Justice Scalia identifies a third consequence of constitutional
protection of gay rights and sexuality: the legal legitimization
and recognition of new forms of marriage. First, he sees the fu-
ture substantive Due Process Constitutional validation of gay
marriage. In an opinion, the Supreme Court explicitly distin-
guished the constitutional protection of gay sexuality from the
constitutional recognition of the validity of gay marriage. Justice
Scalia writes, "Do not believe it.... Today's opinion dismantles
the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinc-
tion to be made between heterosexual and homosexual un-
ions.. . . ",94 In addition, Justice Scalia sees the constitutional
protection of gay rights as weakening the prohibitions against po-
lygamy. If a majority of voters cannot preserve their views of
homosexual immorality by means of majoritarian law making,
then other immoral minorities, such as polygamists, should be
constitutionally protected. According to Justice Scalia, polyga-
mists have no fewer constitutional rights than gays.9 5
91 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the majority's decision
as reflecting the "law-profession culture" that is motivated by homosexual activist agenda
"directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homo-
sexual conduct").
92 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 652-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's
declaration of unconstitutionality merely reflects views and values of the lawyer class,
and that such opinion "of what 'prejudices' must be stamped out may be contrasted with
the more plebeian attitudes that apparently still prevail in the United States Congress,
which has been unresponsive to repeated attempts to extend to homosexuals the protec-
tions of federal civil rights laws").
93 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 603-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But persuading one's fel-
low citizens is one thing, and imposing one's views in absence of democratic majority will
is something else .... But it is the premise of our system that those judgments are to be
made by the people, and not imposed by a governing caste that knows best.").
94 Id. at 604.
95 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 648 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ( 'The Court's disposition today
suggests that these provisions are unconstitutional, and that polygamy must be permitted
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Justice Scalia's consequential thinking results in a very broad
sweeping picture of America weakened by a gay-lawyer elite at-
tack on mainstream-American traditional morality. On the other
hand, Justice Kennedy utilizes a vastly different approach to
consequential thinking.
B. Justice Kennedy and the Consequences of Constitutionalizing
the Execution of the Young
Justice Kennedy utilizes consequential thinking when he ana-
lyzes whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of
teenagers who are convicted of committing murder between the
ages of sixteen and eighteen. 96 For this Eighth Amendment issue,
Justice Kennedy utilizes a constitutional interpretive style that
is very similar to Justice Breyer's style. Justice Kennedy notes
that the Eighth Amendment "must be interpreted according to its
text, by considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with
due regard for its purpose and function in the constitutional de-
sign."97 Justice Breyer similarly finds that for constitutional in-
terpretation "most judges agree that these basic elements-
language, history, tradition, precedent, purpose, and conse-
quence-are useful .... ,"98 Justice Kennedy focuses on the pur-
poses of the Eighth Amendment to protect individuals from ex-
cessive sanctions by assuring that punishment for crime remains
graduated and proportioned to the offense. 99
Although Justice Kennedy mentions purpose in his list of basic
elements of textual interpretation, he omits consequences. How-
ever, he makes consequences a major component of his Eighth
in these States on a state-legislated, or perhaps even localoption, basis -- unless, of course,
polygamists for some reason have fewer constitutional rights than homosexuals.").
96 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) ('The beginning point is a review of
objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures
.... This data gives us essential instruction. We then must determine, in the exercise of
our own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punish-
ment for juveniles.").
97 Id. at 560.
98 BREYER, supra note 1, at 8. Justice Breyer discusses judges' implementation of simi-
larly fundamental techniques when interpreting a statute or constitutional provision and
states, "All judges use similar basic tools to help them accomplish the task." Id. at 7.
9 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-61 ('CTo implement this framework we have established
the propriety and affirmed the necessity of referring to 'the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society' to determine which punishments are so dis-
proportionate as to be cruel and unusual." (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01
(1958) (plurality opinion))).
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Amendment analysis when he writes, "We then must deter-
mine.., whether the death penalty is a disproportionate pun-
ishment for juveniles."100 First, Justice Kennedy reviews whether
a consensus exists among the states as to whether older teenag-
ers who commit murder should be put to death.10 1 Then, Justice
Kennedy gauges the consequences of allowing under the Eighth
Amendment the execution of sixteen to eighteen-year-old teenag-
ers who commit murder. 10 2
Justice Kennedy measures the consequences of executing older
teenage murderers in the light of proportionality of punishment.
The Eighth Amendment requires only those whose extreme cul-
pability makes them the most deserving of execution to be put to
death,10 3 and Justice Kennedy tests the consequences, or impact
of execution upon the moral capabilities of older teenagers. If
older teenage murderers faced execution, the consequences would
be negative and constitutionally impermissible, because
"[r]etribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty
[(execution)] is imposed on one whose culpability or blamewor-
thiness is diminished ... by reason of youth and immaturity."' 10 4
Justice Kennedy observes that young people lack maturity and a
developed sense of responsibility. 0 5 Not only does this mean that
capital punishment retribution is visited on those with dimin-
ished blameworthiness, but the deterrent effect of capital pun-
ishment is weak because older teenagers remain incapable of the
kind of cost-benefit analysis implied by capital punishment as de-
100 Id. at 564. "When a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime ... the State cannot
extinguish his life .... The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many
purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line
for death eligibility ought to rest." Id. at 573-74.
101 See id. at 564-68 (noting that even in those "20 states" without a prohibition on the
juvenile death penalty, "the practice is infrequent").
102 See id. at 568-76 (noting that the majority of states has prohibited the execution of
juveniles under eighteen and that even if it were allowed it would be imprudent because
deterrence and retribution is not as strong with minors as it is with adults).
103 Id. at 568 ("Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit 'a
narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them
'the most deserving of execution."' (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002))).
104 Id. at 571.
10 See id. at 569 (['L]ack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are
found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the
young."' (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993))).
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terrence. 106 Overall, Justice Kennedy finds that the consequence
of subjecting older teenagers to capital punishment is the execu-
tion of the immature, irresponsible, and the intellectually weak.
Justice Kennedy posits his consequential analysis of subjective
teenage murderers to the death penalty on more than just his
own observations about the nature of children and childhood.
Though Justice Kennedy recognizes that parents know the lack
of maturity and responsibility of children, he primarily relies
upon the results of social scientific research about children to
support his conclusions. Justice Kennedy identifies a number of
behaviors observed in social scientific exploration of adolescent
minds and behavior. First, social science has observed teenagers
to be statistically overrepresented in reckless behavior.107 Justice
Kennedy cites to social scientific sources to support this asser-
tion.108 Second, Justice Kennedy finds that children are vulner-
able and susceptible to outside pressures, especially peer pres-
sures, because children possess little control over their
environments.10 9 Again, Justice Kennedy finds social scientific
support for his characterization of children. 110 Finally, Justice
Kennedy observes that the "character of a juvenile is not as well
formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are
more transitory, less fixed."'11 Once again, Justice Kennedy bases
his knowledge of teenagers on social scientific thinking. 1 2
Justice Kennedy utilizes a style of consequential thinking that
identifies very specific consequences of capital punishment for
older teenagers, the execution of immature, psychologically weak
people; he further enunciates disciplined, observable bases for his
consequences. These characteristics of Justice Kennedy's conse-
106 See id. at 571-72 (noting that the probability that teenagers have made the cost-
benefit analysis with respect to capital punishment "is so remote as to be virtually non-
existent"' (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988))).
107 Id. at 569 (quoting Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmen-
tal Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 339 (1992)).
108 Id. at 569 (citing Arnett, supra note 107, at 339).
109 See id. at 569 (noting "that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures").
110 Id. at 569 (citing Lawrence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilt by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile
Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
1I Id. at 570.
112 Id. at 570 (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (W. W. Norton
1968).
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quential thinking mark it as very different and more persuasive
than Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia.
IV. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONSEQUENTIAL THINKING AS THE
MEANINGFUL ALTERNATIVE TO JUSTICE BREYER'S AND JUSTICE
SCALIA'S CONSEQUENTIAL THINKING
At first glance, Justice Scalia's consequential thinking style is
very similar to Justice Breyer's microscopic consequential think-
ing style. 113 Like Justice Breyer, Justice Scalia is very specific in
identifying the consequences flowing from discrete constitutional
protections, namely that a constitutional protection of sexual ori-
entation will undermine majoritarian morality leading to the le-
galization and prevalence of traditionally-proscribed behaviors.
The constitutional protection of gay rights will result in the
domination of the electoral mainstream majority by a gay
agenda-driven alliance of lawyers and gay rights activists. Jus-
tice Breyer sees the rise of religious and social divisiveness re-
sulting from the constitutional legitimization of governmental fi-
nancial support for religious education, 114 while Justice Scalia
sees the oppression of the American majority by the constitu-
tional acceptance of gays. However, Justice Scalia's consequen-
tial thinking is very different from Justice Breyer's thinking.
While Justice Breyer is speculative and futuristic in his vision
of social and religious discord, Justice Scalia is fantastical in his
view of the impact of equal rights for gays and lesbians on
American society. For Justice Scalia, it is not a vision of what
might happen in the future, but a view of what exists in America
today. Justice Scalia views the constitutional protection of gay
sexual intimacy as entailing a massive disruption of the current
social order. 115 He does not envision a potential future disruption;
he writes as if the disruption exists today. Justice Scalia writes
about the current existence of an antidemocratic gay-lawyer elite.
113 See supra notes 17-49 and accompanying text (outlining Justice Breyer's emphasis
on examining purpose and consequence to interpret legal texts).
114 See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (positing Justice Breyer's arguments
against school voucher programs and the sociopolitical consequences of government-
funded religious education).
115 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 591 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the Supreme Court's decision overturning the Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
decision, which held that the Due Process clause of the Constitution did not protect homo-
sexuals' right to engage in consensual sodomy).
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At least Justice Breyer relies on history, albeit sweeping and
vague history, to support his view of constitutional consequences
that existed or exist,116 or Justice Breyer is openly speculative
about future consequences.1 1 7
Justice Scalia constructs an ahistorical current or seemingly
near future world with only the support of his own subjective ob-
servations. He latches onto a limited social phenomenon to prove
the existence of a macroscopic social order in America when he
points to equal rights law school employment recruitment guide-
lines with respect to sexual orientation of the Association of
American Law Schools, which Justice Scalia finds emblematic of
the whole American legal profession's commitment to the gay
agenda. 118 The Association of American Law School anti-bias
policies reflect the law-profession culture that has incorporated
what Justice Scalia describes as the homosexual agenda. 119
Though on the surface Justice Scalia's consequential thinking
appears to be detailed, specific and concrete, his lack of any his-
torical support or empirical bases other than reference to a small
emblematic phenomenon casts Justice Scalia's consequential
thinking as broad and vague. He is more vague and more subjec-
tive than Justice Breyer. Justice Kennedy differs from both Jus-
tices Breyer and Scalia in his consequential thinking.
Justice Kennedy utilizes a more concrete and clearer style of
consequential thinking. For instance, he identifies specific, fo-
cused consequences that will follow from the constitutional le-
gitimization of executing teenage murderers such as the use of
capital punishment to deter people who are psychologically unfit
116 See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (commenting on Justice Breyer's use
of historical and foreign examples to support his view of consequential constitutional in-
terpretation).
117 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (highlighting Justice Breyer's argu-
ments regarding religion in schools).
118 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 653 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This law-
school view of what 'prejudices' must be stamped out may be contrasted with the more
plebeian attitudes that apparently still prevail in the United States Congress, which has
been unresponsive to repeated attempts to extend to homosexuals the protections of fed-
eral civil rights laws.").
119 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court is not
aligned with "mainstream" America, which views homosexuality as immoral and destruc-
tive, and should not impose its judgment, but rather leave the issue to the democratic
process).
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to perform an adequate cost-benefit analysis of their behavior. 120
He bases his observations about consequences on social scientific
observations or thinking. 121 Unlike the speculative or fantastical
style of Justices Breyer or Scalia, Justice Kennedy utilizes ob-
servable, citable phenomenon. While Justice Breyer cites to his-
tory and is specific in its use, he sweeps across many decades and
between centuries, describing in generalities the clash between
Catholics and Protestants in America. 122 Justice Scalia avoids
specificity and utilizes a narrow example to paint a broad picture
of the threat activist gays and their lawyer allies pose to Amer-
ica. 123
Justice Kennedy's style of consequential thinking is more un-
derstandable and therefore ultimately more persuasive than that
of Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia. Justice Kennedy's style is a
more concrete, tangible, and supportable description of conse-
quences flowing from constitutional doctrine, allowing the legal
thinker and practitioner to appreciate the validity of the insights
about the consequences. For instance, Justice Kennedy faced the
problem of a teenager's brutality in analyzing the proportionality
of imposing the death sentence on teenage killers. 124 The factual
context of his constitutional analysis provides a stark example of
such brutality. A seventeen-year-old boy and an accomplice
broke into a home, awoke the victim, covered the victim's eyes,
bound her and drove her to a nearby state park, where they tied
her hands and feet together, wrapped her face in duct tape and
threw her from a railroad trestle into a river. 125 This brutality
fits within the traditional standard for capital punishment that
120 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005) (positing, for example, that imma-
ture and undeveloped juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence because their culpa-
bility is lower than that of adults).
121 See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text (discussing Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-
72).
122 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718-21 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(outlining religious history in America, beginning with the passing of the First Amend-
ment to the influx of immigrants in the 20th century).
123 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 652-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that lawyers are
freely able to reject interviewees because of several personal reasons, but cannot freely
refuse to hire on the basis of sexual orientation).
124 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-71 (reasoning that the developmental and cognitive dif-
ferences between juveniles and adults yield the "diminished culpability of juveniles" that
makes it "evident that the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to [juve-
niles] with lesser force than to adults").
125 Id. at 556-57 (describing the details of murder committed by Christopher Simmons,
then age seventeen, and his accomplice, Charles Benjamin, age fifteen).
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Justice Kennedy describes as befitting a narrow category of the
most serious criminals whose extreme culpability makes them
the most deserving of execution. 126
The death sentence is reserved for the brutal; children occa-
sionally can be, and are, brutal. Justice Kennedy had to contend
with a middle-ground position that allows juries to weigh the
brutality of the crime against the immaturity and irresponsibility
of the offender. In the context of proportionality, Justice Ken-
nedy could balance this logical view of brutality and immaturity
against a concrete and objectively supportable model of child-
offenders as inherently different from adult offenders. He could
point to the transient immaturity of teenagers and the American
Psychiatric Association rule that forbids psychiatrists from diag-
nosing patients under eighteen as having antisocial personality
disorder. Justice Kennedy observes, "[i]f trained psychiatrists
with the advantage of clinical testing and observation refrain...
from assessing any juvenile ... as having antisocial personality
disorder, we conclude that States should refrain from asking ju-
rors to issue a far graver condemnation. ... 127
Justice Kennedy's theory about the constitutional conse-
quences that result from allowing children to face execution en-
ables the advocate to examine the validity of those theories. His
theory implies that the consequences are real and believable.
Other observers may come to a different conclusion about those
constitutional consequences. At a minimum, the counter-
conclusions must be based on the tangible and supportable con-
cepts. The consequences Justice Breyer focuses on are based on
vague historical references, 128 or Socratic questions about specu-
lative outcomes. 129 The advocate has very little to search to test
the validity of those observations. Vague history and speculative
126 See id. at 568 ("Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit
a narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them
'the most deserving of execution."' (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002))).
127 Id. at 573.
128 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 719-21 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("When [the United States Supreme Court] decided [the twentieth century] Establishment
Clause cases, the Court did not deny that an earlier American Society might have found a
less clear-cut church/state separation compatible with social tranquility.").
129 See id. at 724 ("How are state officials to adjudicate claims that one religion or an-
other is advocating, for example, civil disobedience in response to unjust laws, the use of
illegal drugs in religious ceremony, or resort to force to call attention to what it views as
an immoral social practice?").
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questions describe very little. Consequently, the religious person
who wants the government to financially support religious educa-
tion will have difficulty concretely understanding why govern-
ment-funded religious education will cause religious divisiveness.
Unfortunately, such advocates are challenged to develop a vague
counter historical view.130
Justice Scalia is even more vague than Justice Breyer. Accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, a culture war is raging in America, and gay
Americans are viewed as leading immoral and destructive lives.
There are many Americans who need to avoid gay American
business partners because somehow their gay agenda will un-
dermine the traditional moral opprobrium attached to homosex-
ual conduct. 131 Justice Scalia never defines well the parameters
of the so called "culture wars." At best, he identifies gay activists
and lawyers as the warriors of one side, but fails to more fully de-
fine the warriors on the other side. They are only identified as
part of a nebulous American mainstream that includes business
people, teachers, and scoutmasters. Justice Scalia fails to pro-
vide any citation to support his propositions about the culture
war. He never provides historical, social, scientific, or public-
opinion evidence about the referenced culture war. In addition,
he never tests whether gay Americans actually do threaten
American morality and whether the consequences of constitu-
tionally protecting gay sexuality contribute to those threats. Jus-
tice Scalia leaves the advocate with little or nothing.to counter.
There is no way to demonstrate a more positive consequence to
constitutional protection of gay sexuality because there is no way
to know or understand the bases of any negative consequence.
Justices Breyer and Scalia utilize consequential thinking in
analyzing constitutional doctrine and application of constitu-
tional doctrines. However, their style is vague and speculative,
rendering this consequential thinking useless to the constitu-
tional advocate. This weakness in consequential analysis is es-
pecially problematic for Justice Breyer.
13o See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683-84 (2005) (stating that the history of the
Establishment Clause and United States' heritage require the Court to maintain clear
division between church and state).
131 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (expressing con-
cerns about the appearance of the Court taking sides and illuminating the views of many
threatened Americans).
2008]
ST JOI-N'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
V. RETHINKING AND RECASTING JUSTICE BREYER'S
CONSEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS
Justice Breyer explicitly writes that consequences are impor-
tant to his thinking about legal texts including the Constitution.
He links his emphasis on active liberty, 132 the constitutional pro-
tection of democratic involvement in governmental decision-
making, 133 with "a broader interpretive approach that places con-
siderable importance upon consequences .... ",134 Justice Breyer
criticizes judges who undervalue the use of consequential think-
ing in their legal, textual, and constitutional analyses, accusing
those judges of exacting a high constitutional price by undervalu-
ing purpose and consequential thinking.1 35 Likewise, his utiliza-
tion of vague, sweeping, consequential thinking 136 undermines
his own commitment to the importance of consequential thinking
for interpreting legal texts including the Constitution. Justice
Kennedy's clearer style of consequential thinking would
strengthen Justice Breyer's consequential thinking, demonstrat-
ing for Justice Breyer the utility of consequential thinking.
Justice Breyer points to the Establishment Clause and the
separation of church and state as a prime constitutional doctrine
where the consequences of doctrine matter. 37 Justice Kennedy's
identification of focused consequences and utilization of specific
citable sources' 38 would assist Justice Breyer in making his con-
sequential points much clearer. For instance, to support his
macroscopic view of the consequences of not separating church
and state, 39 he points to the sweeping history in the seventeenth
132 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 11 (introducing the theme of active liberty and "how in-
creased emphasis upon that theme can help judges interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions").
'13 BREYER, supra note 1, at 21 (describing active liberty as "the right of individuals to
participate in democratic self-government").
134 BREYER, supra note 1, at 11-12.
135 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 12 (expressing his thesis of focusing "increased atten-
tion upon the Consitution's democratic objective").
136 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (ana-
lyzing historical Court decisions surrounding the Establishment Clause).
137 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 120-24 (explaining how considering consequences
helped him formulate opinions concerning cases implicating the Establishment Clause).
138 See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text (discussing Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 568-72 (2005)).
139 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (noting Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639, 718-25 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
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and eighteenth centuries. 140 In order to make a point about the
early context of the Establishment Clause, Justice Breyer not
only clarifies the objectives of the Establishment Clause, but also
the effects it has upon quelling religious war and contentious-
ness. Justice Breyer does cite to some general sources about
American law and religion and law in America. 141 However,
unlike Justice Kennedy, he remains vague in his description of
purposes and consequences and the sources that support both.
He goes on to assert that in American and English history, "[t]he
history of governmentally established religion ... showed that
whenever government had allied itself with one particular form
of religion, the inevitable result has been that it had incurred the
hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary
beliefs.' 1 42 Justice Breyer is not only vague and general about the
consequence of no Establishment Clause or the weak application
of the separation of church and state, but he cites as a source for
the proposition another Supreme Court case, Engel v. Vitale,143
even quoting from it.144
Justice Breyer could likely make his point about the negative
consequences of not separating church and state by focusing on
twentieth-century German history. Justice Breyer has no objec-
tion to utilizing non-American and non-English social circum-
stances to demonstrate religious divisiveness, as he points to con-
temporary France to demonstrate religious divisiveness in a
140 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (commenting that during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Establishment Clause was understood as pro-
moting the objectives of the First Amendment, and embodied that view that religious tol-
erance was essential to a free society).
141 See BARRY A. KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: RELIGION
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY 24 (1993) (highlighting that Congress in 1789 en-
acted the First Amendment in order to forbid the establishment of a national church to
avoid the religious wars that plagued Europe); see also LORD RADCLIFFE, THE LAW & ITS
COMPASS 70-71 (1960) (stating that the founding fathers believed that "they were entitled
to worship God in their own way and to teach their children and to form their characters
in the way that seemed to them calculated to impress the stamp of the God-fearing man");
see also Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1692
(1969) (explaining that while political debate normally helps to reach compromise, the
First Amendment was not intended to divide individuals by their religion).
142 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 718-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
143 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
144 Id. at 431 ('The history of governmentally established religion, both in England and
in this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular
form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect
and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs.").
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society that has been historically socially homogeneous. 145 Cer-
tainly, Germany in the twentieth century demonstrates the divi-
sive consequences when the elite ally with governmental power
to support particular forms of religion and oppose other forms of
religion.
Justice Breyer could utilize the Nazi regime's involvement with
Christian religion as an example of the negative consequences
that occur when state and religion intertwine, especially in the
first years of the Nazi government in Germany. Chancellor Hit-
ler created a Ministry of Church Affairs, which helped one seg-
ment of the German Evangelical Church to regroup in order to
increase control over church issues. 146 The Nazi leadership en-
dorsed a candidate for Reich Minister in a newly created Reich
Church,' 47 which Hitler supported as a means to unify German
Protestants. 148 The small group of German Evangelicals who re-
grouped continued to control over German Protestantism and
had already dominated the process of unifying the regional Prot-
estant churches into one Reich church. 149 This group maintained
power over the Protestant churches during the Nazi govern-
ment's rule, holding important positions that controlled revenues
and decision-making. 150 Those German Protestants who pro-
tested a centralized regime dominated by the Protestant Church
faced opposition, 151 including harsh reprisals from the govern-
145 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 725 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that France has recon-
ciled school funding and religious freedom without creating serious problems because it is
more religiously homogenous than the United States, but recently there has been prob-
lems due to recent waves of immigration).
146 See DORIS L. BERGIN, TWISTED CROSS: THE GERMAN CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT IN THE
THIRD REICH 18 (1996) ("In July 1935, Hitler created the new Ministry for Church Affairs
under Hans Kerrl. Unintentionally, that attempt by Nazi authorities to increase their
control of church issues signaled the onset of German Christian efforts to regroup.").
147 RICHARD STEIGMANN-GALL, THE HOLY REICH: NAZI CONCEPTIONS OF CHRISTIANITY,
1919-1945 159 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) ("Hitler's candidate to head a newly created
Reich Church in the position of Reich Bishop was Muller.").
148 See STEIGMANN-GALL, supra note 147, at 158 (stating that Hitler made Frick his of-
ficial liaison and informed him that he was interested in reaching "an agreement with
institutional Protestantism").
149 See BERGIN, supra note 146, at 15 (describing how the German Christians unified
the twenty-nine regional Protestant churches into "the Protestant Reich Church").
150 See BERGIN, supra note 146, at 2 (stating that German Christians desired "to retain
their religious traditions while supporting the Nazi fatherland").
151 See WOLFGANG GERLACH, AND THE WITNESSES WERE SILENT: THE CONFESSING
CHURCH AND THE PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS 25-30 (Victoria J. Barnett, ed. & trans.,
2000) (explaining that those who were in opposition would find themselves at odds even
with friends).
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ment. I5 2 The German Minister of Church Affairs worked to bring
unity to the Protestant Churches, 153 which resulted in the Godes-
berg Declaration. 154 The declaration specifically rejected a uni-
versal Christianity, labeled Christianity in irreconcilable reli-
gious opposition to Judaism, and announced the establishment of
a new institute to research the elimination of the Jewish influ-
ence in German Church life.155
That the Nazi Government would side with Christianity should
be no surprise as the Nazi Party official program Article 24 read:
"The Party... stands for a positive Christianity, without binding
itself denominationally .... It fights against the Jewish-
materialistic spirit at home. ... 156 Hitler envisioned Nazism as
a Christian movement casting it as religious politics. 157 As Reich
Chancellor, Hitler advocated for active Christianity. 158 The Third
Reich implemented a Christian agenda struggling against God-
lessness. 59 Much of the top leadership of the Nazi government
sustained an allegiance to positive Christianity by celebrating
Martin Luther and positioning themselves as Luther's succes-
sors. 60 Martin Luther had expressed a strong anti-Semitic ha-
tred of Judaism.' 61 Hitler, working within a Christian anti-
Semitic context, stated that anti-Semitic legislation had done a
152 See GERLACH, supra note 151, at 113-14 (noting that this includes imprisonment).
153 See BERGIN, supra note 146, at 18-19 (positing that under Hanns Kerrl, the Minis-
try for Church Affairs fermented the consolidation of various subgroups which formed the
League of German Christians).
154 See BERGIN, supra note 146, at 19 (highlighting the pledge of solidarity of both Ger-
man and non-German Christian groups).
155 See BERGIN, supra note 146, at 24 (listing the Declaration's four main points, three
of which addressed race).
156 See BETRAYAL: GERMAN CHURCHES AND THE HOLOCAUST 215 n.2 (Robert P. Ericksen
& Susannah Heschel eds., 1999) (quoting Article 24 from the official program of the
NSDAP).
157 See STEIGMANN-GALL, supra note 147, at 60-61 (summarizing Hitler's speech at
Passau).
1s See STEIGMANN-GALL, supra note 147, at 116 (explaining the difference between
positive and active Christianity).
159 See STEIGMANN-GALL, supra note 147, at 117 (stating that the Third Reich was not
only fighting for purer morality, but also targeting the decomposition of Christianity).
160 See STEIGMANN-GALL, supra note 147, at 154 (noting that those who "sustained
their allegiance" to positive Christianity "celebrated Luther as a national hero, and posi-
tioned themselves as his inheritors").
161 See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONER'S: ORDINARY
GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST 53 (Alfred A. Knopf 1996) (highlighting that Martin Lu-
ther was placed "in the pantheon of antisemites" because of his ferocious and influential
anti-Semitic views).
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great service to Christianity by pushing Jews to the margins of
German society. 162 Hitler conceived marginalizing the Jews him-
self as the Catholic Church had done for 1,500 years. 163 Cer-
tainly, some Protestants saw the Nazi anti-Jewish eliminationist
policy, particularly Kristalnacht and Martin Luther's anti-
Semitic religious belief, as a continuation of Christian theological
attitudes aimed at the Jews.164
The relationship between the German state and German relig-
ions during the 1930's and 1940's provides Justice Breyer a clear
example of the negative consequences related to religious and so-
cial divisiveness. Such an example is within the living memory
of some Americans. Justice Breyer would rely upon the research
of historians to support his example of the negative consequences
that result when church and state mingle.1 65 Justice Breyer can
relate his twentieth century German example to his vague
statements about seventeenth-century Europe, prior to the writ-
ing of the American Constitution.166 The German experience, in
the twentieth century, certainly evidences a continuing problem
with religious divisiveness in Europe into modern times. 167 Jus-
tice Breyer also could relate this relatively recent continuing so-
cial chaos in Europe to the more peaceful, flexible social circum-
stances in America into which many religious Europeans
162 See STEIGMANN-GALL, supra note 147, at 118 ("Hitler suggested that the antisemitic
legislation being taken was in line with Christian principle ... ").
163 See GUENTER LEWY, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND NAzI GERMANY 51-52 (McGraw
Hill Book Co. 1964) (discussing that Hitler found National Socialism and Catholicism to
be in "fundamental agreement" as the Church banished Jews into the ghetto because they
considered them to be parasites).
164 See GOLDHAGEN, supra note 161, at 111 (suggesting that "many prominent Church
leaders threw their moral weight behind anti-Jewish measures" as a result of the "elimi-
nationist antisemitism" that permeated the Protestant churches).
165 For Example Doris L. Bergin has taught history at the University of Vermont and
Richard Steigman-Gall has taught history at Kent State University. Daniel Jonah Gold-
hagen has taught Government and Social Studies at Harvard University, and Wolfgang
Gerlach completed his doctoral studies at the Evangelical Theological Faculty at the Uni-
versity of Hamburg.
166 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting
that the Constitutional understanding "that liberty and social stability demand a reli-
gious tolerance that respects" all religious views was not reached until after "decades of
religious war" in the seventeenth century).
167 See ARNO J. MAYER, WHY DID THE HEAVENS NOT DARKEN? THE "FINAL SOLUTION" IN
HISTORY 30-31 (Pantheon Books 1988) (emphasizing "the myth and lore of holy war" of
the Thirty Years War of the seventeenth century was "revitalized and exploited three
hundred years later, during the General Crisis and Thirty Years War of the twentieth
century").
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moved.168 The Establishment Clause became a twentieth-century
American bulwark against the transport of European religious
strife to the United States. 169
CONCLUSION
Justice Breyer places great emphasis on the use of consequen-
tial thinking in interpreting legal texts including the Constitu-
tion.170 He especially emphasizes consequential thinking in his
Establishment Clause analyses. 17' However, when Justice Breyer
utilizes consequential thinking, he is vague and sweeping in de-
scribing the consequences of constitutional doctrine and interpre-
tation.1 72 His style of consequential thinking is not much differ-
ent from that of Justice Scalia, who is vague to the point of
fantastical in describing the consequences of constitutional pro-
tection of gay sexuality. 73 Justice Breyer's consequential think-
ing would be stronger and clearer if he utilized the consequential
thinking style of Justice Kennedy, who identified very specific,
focused, understandable, and tangible consequences of constitu-
tionally permitting children to face execution as criminal pun-
ishment. 74 Instead of using vague references to history to dem-
onstrate the socially divisive consequences of intermingling
governmental power with religion, 175 Justice Breyer could clearly
and tangibly demonstrate the negative consequences of a weak
168 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 720 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ('The [twentieth] century Court
was fully aware ... that immigration and growth had changed American society dramati-
cally since its early years.").
169 See id. at 721-22 (suggesting that the Court concluded that the Establishment
Clause required "separation" because in many places there were too many religions, and
"[t]his diversity made it difficult, if not impossible, to devise meaningful forms of 'equal
treatment' by providing an 'equal opportunity' for all to introduce their own religious
practices into the public schools").
170 BREYER, supra note 1, at 11-12.
171 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 120-24 (giving two examples of cases concerning the
Establishment Clause and stating that in both of those cases the consideration of likely
consequences "helped produce a legal result").
172 See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (discussing Zelman, 536 U.S. at 718-
26 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
173 See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text (noting previous United States Su-
preme Court holdings).
174 See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text (discussing Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-
72).
175 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 718-21 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing multiple cases where
the court loosely referred to history in order to show the negative occurrences associated
with nationally sponsored religion).
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wall of separation between church and state by describing the in-
volvement with religion by the Nazi controlled German state. 176
176 See supra notes 147-70 and accompanying text (discussing the Justice's approach to
consequential thinking).
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